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Abstract—Some smartphone applications (APPs) pose a risk to 
users’ personal information. Events of APPs leaking information 
stored in smartphones illustrate the danger that they present. In 
this paper, we investigate the amount of personal information 
leaked during the installation and use of APPs when accessing the 
Internet. We have opted for the implementation of a Man-in-the-
Middle proxy to intercept the network traffic generated by 20 
popular free APPs installed on different smartphones of distinctive 
vendors. This work describes the technical considerations and 
requirements for the deployment of the monitoring WiFi network 
employed during the conducted experiments. The presented 
results show that numerous mobile and personal unique 
identifiers, along with personal information are leaked by several 
of the evaluated APPs, commonly during the installation process. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Smartphone applications (APPs) have been developed at a 
tremendous pace over recent years. In May 2016, market 
analysts indicated that there were more than 3 million APPs 
available on the market [1]. Many businesses and private users 
benefit from the services that they provide, and make daily use 
of these APPs. Nonetheless, some APPs also pose a risk to users’ 
personal information, as they have access to an increasing 
amount of information about their users and their cyber activities 
[2]. Some studies have suggested that the main business model 
for some APP developers is based on the commercialisation of 
personal information by leaking it to third parties, such as 
advertising companies [3]. Incidents of APPs leaking personal 
information stored in the smartphones illustrate the danger that 
the use of these applications pose [4]. 
In this paper we focus on investigating the amount and type 
of personal information that benign APPs might be leaking, and 
the potential privacy-related threats that these applications 
present. In some cases, the developers are responsible for the 
insecurity of the APPs. Smartphone APPs commonly do not use 
secure communication protocols, as many APPs often use the 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) for communication [5]. 
Even when HTTP Secure (HTTPS) is used, if certificates are not 
properly validated, smartphone APPs can cause serious security 
and privacy issues. In fact, the authors of [6] identified a large 
number of APPs that contain Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols that either accept all 
certificates or all hostnames as trusted certificates. However, on 
other occasions, the human factor is responsible for the 
insecurity of the APPS, due to the access permission that is 
granted. When an APP is installed and launched for the first 
time, the user is usually prompted with an access permission 
request to personal information stored in the device. Most users 
do not understand the implications of granting permission to this 
information to the APPs, nor consider what mobile unique 
identifiers and personal unique identifiers might be shared due 
to this permission. 
When an APP makes a system call to the smartphone 
Operating System (OS), it can seek access to a broad list of the 
user’s personal information, such as the list of contacts, location, 
device name, unique identifiers (e.g. device ID), calendar, 
reminders, photos and videos, notes, accounts, call information, 
and WiFi connection information. Accessing this information is 
not necessarily a breach of a user’s privacy, as long as the 
information is utilised locally to provide appropriate service [3]. 
However, when this information is transmitted remotely to third 
parties, then allowing access to this information becomes a 
privacy concern. Although most smartphones have provision for 
disabling tracking settings, this does not guarantee that some 
confidential information is not leaked by the APPs. Therefore, it 
is essential to consider carefully the security and trustworthiness 
of the smartphone APPs being installed and used. 
In this paper, the main aim is to evaluate the amount of 
personal information leaked during the installation and use of 
APPs when accessing the Internet. We consider that an APP 
leaks personal information when such data are transmitted to a 
third party without the user’s consent. We have opted for the 
implementation of a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) proxy to 
intercept the network traffic generated by the smartphone APPs. 
To achieve this, it is necessary to design an active WiFi 
monitoring platform for the interception, decryption and 
analysis of a user’s private information derived from popular 
APPs installed on different smartphones of distinctive vendors. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In 
Section II the most relevant related work is reviewed. The 
experimental methodology followed in this paper is explained in 
Section III. This includes the description of the network testbed 
and the APPs selection, as well as the monitoring system 
configuration. Section IV describes the experimental results. 
Finally, conclusions and future work are given in Section V. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Smartphone APPs have access to a broad list of a user’s 
personal information. Therefore, it is essential to have a 
complete understanding of what information can be accessed by 
these APPs, and to assess the permission that they have to handle 
this information. Also, it is essential to evaluate the amount of 
information that is leaked by smartphone APPs to third parties. 
Generally, Apple iOS devices do not require permission 
from the user. iOS gives limited access to many of the device’s 
sensitive information. Only in certain cases are permission 
requests presented to the user. In contrast, during the installation 
of every Android APP, a list of all the permissions that the APP 
requires is presented to the user. The user has to decide whether 
the APP needs access to the requested information or not. 
Other researchers have also focused on investigating the 
security of mobile APPs and the amount of information that they 
leak. In [7], the authors present a comparative analysis of the 
present state of mobile device security. The authors focus their 
study on Android and Apple iOS devices. The presented 
research analyses the smartphone security from different angles, 
such as the provenance, permissions, and encryption techniques 
of the APPs used by the two evaluated OSs. However, the 
authors do not practically evaluate the information that might be 
leaked to third parties by the smartphone APPs. 
The authors of [4] describe a framework, which is an 
extension of the Android OS, that tracks in real-time how 
different APPs access and manipulate a user’s personal 
information. The main objective of this work is to analyse the 
flow of privacy sensitive information through APPs, and to 
detect when personal data are leaked via untrustworthy APPs. 
The presented framework leveraged the Android’s virtualised 
architecture to integrate four granularities of trace propagation. 
In [8], the authors present a dynamic analysis platform that 
detects private information being leaked by APPs in Android 
and iOS devices. The platform makes analysis directly at the OS 
level of the devices. This work presents thorough comparison 
analysis of the data leaked by both smartphone OSs. 
The authors of [2] present an automated tool to identify 
possible privacy breaches in iOS APPs, and analyse the threat 
they present to a user’s personal information. The presented tool 
constructs control flow graphs to perform data flow analysis, 
which would allow the identification of flows that might leak 
personal information to third parties without a user’s permission. 
This work focuses only on iOS APPs. Since no source code is 
available from the APPs, the tool that the authors present has to 
perform its analysis directly on the binaries. 
In [6], the authors introduce a tool to detect potential 
vulnerabilities against MitM attacks posed by benign Android 
APPs that use SSL/TLS protocols. This tool implements a static 
code analysis of different aspects of the APPs, such as the 
validity of URLs found in APPs and examines inadequate 
SSL/TLS validation made by the APPs. Additionally, the 
authors conduct a real MitM attack against different APPs 
installed in a real phone, and audit the information leaked via 
potentially broken SSL communication channels. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY 
A. Testbed 
One feasible method to evaluate if there is information 
leaked is by the interception of the generated network traffic 
communication by a smartphone using a MitM proxy. An 
experimental WiFi network testbed has been deployed to 
conduct our experiments. We have set up a MitM proxy using 
the software tools Mallory [9] and mitmproxy [10], which 
intercept and decrypt the communication in a transparent 
manner to the network users. The experimental WiFi, depicted 
in Fig. 1, includes one Access Point (AP) connected to the 
Internet through the University’s network, one Laptop acting as 
the MitM monitoring machine running the MitM proxy and a 
rogue AP tool, and various smartphones acting as clients. 
The MitM monitoring machine runs on Linux Ubuntu 
16.04.1. It is connected wirelessly to the AP, and in turn provides 
access to the Internet to all associated smartphones through a 
rogue AP service. This laptop has a built-in wireless Network 
Interface Controller (NIC) that does not support packet injection. 
Therefore, an external ALFA Atheros wireless adapter with the 
Atheros 9271 chip was used during the experiments. The 
smartphones used as clients were one iPhone 4s running iOS 8, 
one iPhone 5 and one iPhone 5s running iOS 9, one Samsung 
Galaxy J5 running Android 4.1.2 OS, and one Samsung Galaxy 
S7262 running Android 5.1.1 OS. 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic design of the IEEE 802.11 network used for monitoring and 
interception of the data generated by the smartphones. 
B. Shortlisting Mobile Applications 
According to the market statistics published in May 2016, 
there were 3 million Android and iOS APPs available on the 
market and, by 2015, iOS APPs alone were downloaded more 
than 100 billion times [1]. Hence, it was essential to shortlist the 
number of APPs used in this work. 
During May 2016, we used the rankings shown in iTunes and 
Google play in order to select the top 20 APPs on iOS and 
Android, respectively. It was initially observed that the ranking 
for the most relevant APPs was different for the two smartphone 
OSs. On the other hand, there are APPs exclusively to one OS, 
not available on the other OS. Hence, the adopted solution was 
to arbitrarily select 60 top APPs from both Android and iOS, and 
then identify those available for both OSs. The 20 smartphone 
APPs selected are shown in Table I. 
TABLE II.  LIST OF SELECTED MOBILE APPS ON ANDROID AND IOS 
Smartphone APPs 
Whatsapp Pinterest Skype Slither.io 
Facebook Soundcloud eBay Snapchat 
Tripadvisor Microsoft Outlook Stack Messenger 
Tinder Amazon BuyVIP Color Switch Instagram 
Uber Twitter Musical.ly Spotify 
C. Monitoring System Configuration 
1) Selecting the Rogue Access Point Attacking Tool 
One of the crucial steps during our experiments was to 
provide access to the Internet to the client smartphones, through 
the MitM monitoring machine, in a transparent manner to the 
clients. The smartphones would access the Internet through the 
ALFA Atheros wireless adapter and the communication had to 
be intercepted by the MitM proxy tool. The monitoring machine 
can create its own rogue AP by using several publicly available 
software, such as HostAPd [11] and Airbase-ng [12]. 
Airbase-ng and HostAPd are tools for turning a Linux 
wireless NIC into an AP. For the purposes of our work, they 
have been used for launching rogue AP services, i.e. lure the 
clients to associate with it, instead of connecting to the legitimate 
AP. The rogue AP masquerades as the legitimate AP, using the 
same MAC address. In case the wireless device of a client is 
already authenticated and associated with the legal AP, each of 
the tools can spoof the identity of the legal AP and send 
disassociation frames to the wireless device. After the client has 
been disassociated, rogue AP tools advertise themselves as the 
legal AP by sending beacon frames. 
Throughout the course of our experiments using an Atheros 
based chipset wireless NIC, we found that the performance, 
particularly in terms of client-rogue AP connectivity, is better 
with the HostAPd tool. In addition, we have found that the 
HostAPd tool, in contrast to Airbase-ng, flags the MAC layer 
frame retransmissions appropriately. This is an advantageous 
feature because HostAPd achieves a performance that closely 
resembles the expected behaviour from a legitimate AP. After 
assessing both tools, it was concluded that that HostAPd was the 
most appropriate to be used in the experiments. 
2) Man-in-the-Middle Proxy Selection and Configuration 
Another essential step was to consider the selection of the 
MitM proxy. There exist numerous options that can be used to 
implement the MitM proxy, including Mallory, mitmproxy, 
Burp Suite, Ettercap, and Charles web debugging proxy. A brief 
description of well-known HTTP proxies written in Java and 
Python can be found in [13]. A list of considerations that help 
with the selection of the MitM proxy is provided in [14]. 
Mallory was initially chosen for our experiments among all 
the available proxies since it meets all the required parameters. 
Mallory allows the implementation of an extensible TCP/UDP 
MitM proxy that is designed to run as a communication gateway, 
and can listen to SSL/TLS encrypted network traffic from/to the 
smartphones. According to [9], there are three different 
installation setups for Mallory. These are WiFi hotspot, Point-
to-Point Tunnelling Protocol (PPTP), and virtual machine. The 
Mallory installation setup WiFi hotspot allows the installation of 
a wireless card acting as an AP through which a victim can 
connect, and the rogue AP can forward the traffic through 
Mallory. Unfortunately, Mallory was discarded at a later stage 
because it was unable to unencrypt correctly the SSL/TLS 
intercepted network traffic in our bespoke setup. Therefore, 
several other proxies were evaluated and Mimtproxy, an 
alternative to Mallory was consequently adopted. 
Similarly to Mallory, mitmproxy has various modes of 
operation. Regular is the default mode where mitmproxy needs 
to be assigned in the client’s proxy configuration settings. In 
cases where we do not have control over the client, mitmproxy 
should work in transparent mode. In this case, the mitmproxy 
can be configured as the client’s next hop node through the 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) settings. Finally, 
there is a reverse mode of operation, which is only used to proxy 
traffic from a server to a client. 
The mitmproxy Certificate Authority (CA) should install a 
certificate in the mobile devices, otherwise, the client can refuse 
the SSL/TLS handshake and cancel the communication. For 
each SSL/TLS encrypted destination server, the mitmproxy CA 
will generate a dummy certificate on-the-fly to impersonate the 
visited website. The CA is created the first time mitmproxy is 
initiated [10]. It is worth noting that some APPs employ HTTP 
Public Key Pinning (HPKP) to prevent possible MitM attacks. 
Warning messages will be triggered if the client receives an 
untrusted certificate that it is not configured to accept. Hence, to 
circumvent this problem, social engineering methods are usually 
employed to lure clients to accept unauthorised certificates. 
The documentation in [10] provides two possible options for 
installing the CA certificate in the mobile devices: quick setup 
or manual setup. In the former, there is provision for a built-in 
certificate installation application which can be accessed, using 
what is called magic domain mitm.it, through a web browser. A 
three-step example of the quick installation of the mitmproxy 
CA is displayed in Fig. 2. The client should select the icon that 
corresponds to its smartphone. The selection of the appropriate 
icon leads to the installation of the CA. On the other hand, the 
manual setup is used when the quick setup is not available. 
mitmproxy has provided a list of pointers to manual certificate 
installation documentation for some common platforms in [10]. 
 
Fig. 2. Overview of the three-step mitmproxy CA installation process. a) The 
client selects the appropriate platform icon; b) The mitmproxy CA is installed; 
c) The smartphone confirms the correct CA installation. 
There is still a need for running the DHCP server and then 
assigning firewall rules using the iptables tool. There was also 
the need for port redirection and port masquerading while 
running mitmproxy. By default, mitmproxy listens on TCP port 
8080, and, in order to permit interception of HTTP and HTTPS, 
ports 80 and 443 had to be forwarded to port 8080. The enabling 
of Network Address Translation (NAT) is also required. Both 
the NAT functionality and the port forwarding were done using 
the iptables tool. Further details about all the commands and 
steps undertaken to install, configure and customise the system 
can be found in [15]. After completing the configuration, a 
smartphone connected to the rogue AP could access the Internet. 
The Ubuntu variant for assigning DHCP is the isc-dhcp-sever. 
This is a necessary step to assign IP addresses to clients 
connecting to the rogue AP tool HostAPd. 
IV. EVALUATION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This section describes the findings from running the two 
MitM proxies. It is worth noting that Mallory proxy was unable 
to successfully decrypt the communication traffic. Hence, most 
of the results provided in this section are from mitmproxy. 
The intercepted network traffic was stored in an SQLite 
database when Mallory was utilised, whereas it was stored as 
binary files when the MitM proxy used was mitmproxy. In the 
case of the Mallory proxy, the tool DB Browser for SQLite [16] 
was chosen to extract and analyse the information due to the data 
manipulation flexibility that this tool provides. In the case of 
mitmproxy, the MitM proxy itself provides a mechanism to read 
binary files and this method was used when applicable. 
Mitmproxy was able to intercept many personal and private 
parameters. We have focused our analysis on the unique 
identifiers International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), Unique Device 
Identifier (UDID), Universally Unique Identifier (UUID), 
Mobile Country Code (MCC), Mobile Network Code (MNC), 
MAC address of the smartphones, address book contacts, email, 
usernames, passwords, and location. 
A. Analysis of Intercepted Data by Mallory Proxy 
The clients could access the Internet through the rogue AP, 
and Mallory proxy was able to capture the communication 
streams, as well as the source and destination IP addresses. Upon 
running different APPs, the data intercepted were saved and 
extracted using DB browser for SQLite. In total, five tables were 
created: connections, dgram, flows, fuzztcp and fuzzudp. All the 
tables were critically analysed to identify whether a user’s 
personal information is actually leaked by the evaluated APPs. 
We found that, apart from a number of GET and POST 
requests, the rest of the intercepted information was still 
encrypted despite the use of Mallory. Despite multiple technical 
configuration changes, Mallory was unable to decrypt the 
communication. Both Airbase-ng and HostAPd were tested to 
determine if the use of an alternative rogue AP would produce 
different results, but this was not the case as similar behaviour 
was observed. The lack of readable decrypted information 
proved that the use of Mallory proxy was ineffective, and this is 
the reason why we decided to discard the use of Mallory. As part 
of the experiments, it was also observed that when a connection 
was established to a client, the connection was extremely slow 
and the communication link was disconnected in most cases. 
B. Analysis and Results of Intercepted Data by mitmproxy 
During the experiments conducted with mitmproxy, the 
APPs were downloaded and installed in the smartphones while 
connected to the rogue AP in the monitoring machine running 
the MitM proxy. The reason for doing this was to observe if any 
personal information was leaked during this required process 
towards the use of the APP. Then, we accessed and clicked on 
all the available links within the APP for at least 10 minutes. 
During the installation process or when the APPs were launched 
for the first time, a list of all the resources that the APP required 
permission to access was presented to the user. However, it is 
not a simple process to verify what specific information each 
APP actually accesses. It is expected that this information is 
utilised by the APPs locally to the device to provide appropriate 
service [3]. Additionally, there were some cases in which the 
APP did not request access permission. 
Focusing first on the results extracted from the smartphones 
running Android OS, mitmproxy shows that several unique 
identifiers were leaked by different APPs. Mitmproxy GUI 
presents three tabs that can be accessed and different pieces of 
personal information are presented in each of the tabs. These are 
Request, Response, and Details. For instance, Fig. 3 shows the 
mitmproxy output when the APP Twitter was installed and 
launched. In this example, the UDID of the smartphone was 
leaked, along with other device ID parameters, such as the IP 
address. An assessment on the APP Whatsapp also shows that 
the MAC address, UUID, UDID and IMEI were all leaked 
during an update. This is shown in Fig. 4. However, after 
completing the update installation process, not all information 
observed was leaked. This implies that there are APPs that leak 
information mainly during the installation process. Furthermore, 
the APP Whatsapp requested access permission to email 
addresses, contact names, phone numbers, and images. Another 
example is the assessment of the APP Spotify. Mitmproxy was 
able to intercept, among others, the IMEI and IMSI from the 
overall information leaked by this application. 
 
Fig. 3. Mitmproxy GUI: Overview of the leaked information intercepted when 
the APP Twitter was installed and launched in an Android OS device. 
 
Fig. 4. Mitmproxy GUI: Overview of the leaked information intercepted when 
the APP Whatsapp was installed and launched in an Android OS device. 
In order to verify that our mitmproxy implementation was 
correctly configured, we used multiple mobile web applications 
(e.g. access Facebook through a web browser rather than a 
dedicated APP) to securely authenticate with the web server. 
Mitmproxy was successful in intercepting the username and 
password in these situations. These results indicate that all 
keystrokes entered in the mobile web applications were being 
captured and decrypted by mitmproxy. 
Table II presents an overall description of all the information 
leaked that we have identified after analysing all the chosen 
APPs. In summary, the device model, OS version, codename, IP 
address, device ID and country name were leaked by all the 
APPs. The results also indicate that 5 out of the 20 APPs leaked 
the IMEI and IMSI. Only 3 APPs leaked information regarding 
the location. Furthermore, almost all the APPs leaked the MNC 
and MCC. The MAC address was leaked only by the APPs 
Whatsapp and Pinterest. Also, neither Uber or Stack leaked any 
email address, username and password. Only 6 out of the 20 
examined APPs leaked email addresses, whereas the rest of the 
APPs leaked email addresses, username and password. 
It is also worth noting that some of the APPs could not be 
installed in Android 4.1.2 due to incompatibility problems. In 
such cases, the APPs were installed only on the available 
Android 5.1.1. Furthermore, despite the two Android phones 
accepting the mitmproxy certificate, there were cases in which a 
warning message of client certificate error was shown. However, 
the user could ignore these messages and the connection would, 
therefore, be accepted. Finally, mostly in the case of Android 
5.1.1, a warning message was shown indicating that that the 
communication might be compromised. These messages were 
ignored for experimental purposes. 
Once we finished with the analysis of the phones running 
Android OS, we focused our experiments on the iOS devices. In 
contrast to the previous experiments, it was not possible to install 
any APP in any iPhone while connected to the rogue AP. This 
applies to all the iPhones that were tested. Hence, we decided to 
install the APPs using a legitimate AP and then, once the APPs 
were correctly installed in the iPhones, proceed with the analysis 
using the rogue AP. Although this approach would let us to 
proceed with the experiments, the results obtained from the 
devices running Android could not be used for comparison, 
since we are missing the possible information being leaked 
during the installation process. Therefore, a set of comparison 
experiments was conducted in both Android OS and iOS during 
the usage process of the APPs, not considering the installation 
process. During this new analysis, ten APPs were evaluated. The 
results for these experiments are presented in Table III. 
As we can see from the results, none of the APPs leaked the 
MAC address, contacts, IMEI and IMSI. These results indicate 
that multiple APPs leak information solely during installation 
process. This is clear specially in the case of the IMEI and IMSI. 
Also, information regarding the location is leaked by almost the 
same number of APPs both in Android and iOS (i.e. 3 and 2 out 
of 10, respectively). Furthermore, there is an evident difference 
between the amount of information leaked by the APPs in 
Android and iOS, when observing the rest of the evaluated 
unique identifiers and personal information. For instance, the 
logging details were leaked by 8 APPs on Android while none 
of the APPs on iOS leaked this information. Similarly, the MNC 
and MCC, and the UDID and UUID were leaked by 7 and 5 
APPs, respectively, in Android. In contrast, this information was 
only leaked by 1 APP in iOS. Additionally, there were two 
TABLE II. PERSONAL INFORMATION LEAKED DURING THE INSTALLATION AND USE OF APPS RUNNING IN ANDROID OS 
APP 
Confidential Parameters of Interest 
IMEI / IMSI Location Email / Username / Password Contacts MAC Address UDID / UUID MCC / MNC 
Whatsapp Yes No Email only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Facebook No No All No No Yes Yes 
Tripadvisor Yes No All No No Yes Yes 
Tinder No No All No No Yes Yes 
Uber No No No No No Yes Yes 
Pinterest Yes No All No Yes Yes Yes 
Soundcloud No No All Yes No Yes Yes 
Microsoft Outlook No No All No No Yes Yes 
Amazon BuyVIP No No Email only No No Yes Yes 
Twitter No No Email only Yes No Yes Yes 
Skype No No Email only Yes No Yes Yes 
eBay No Yes All No No Yes Yes 
Stack No Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Color Switch No No Email only No No Yes Yes 
Musical.ly No No All No No Yes Yes 
Slither.io Yes No All No No Yes Yes 
Snapchat No No All No No Yes Yes 
Messenger No No Email only No No No Yes 
Instagram No Yes All Yes No Yes No 
Spotify Yes No All No No Yes Yes 
TABLE III. PERSONAL INFORMATION LEAKED DURING THE USE OF APPS RUNNING IN ANDROID OS AND APPLE IOS 
APP 
Confidential Parameters of Interest 
IMEI / IMSI Location Email / Username / Password Contacts MAC Address UDID / UUID MCC / MNC 
Android iOS Android iOS Android iOS Android iOS Android iOS Android iOS Android iOS 
Accuweather No No Yes Yes No No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Slither.io No No No No Yes No No No No No No Yes No No 
Musical.ly No No No No Yes No No No No No No No No No 
eBay No No No No Yes No No No No No No No No No 
Messenger No No No No No No No No No No Yes No Yes No 
Spotify No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes No 
Pinterest No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes No 
ISS Tracker No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No Yes No 
Tripadvisor No No Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes No 
Soundcloud No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes No 
 
instances in which information relating to the location, and the 
UDID and UUID was not leaked during the initial experiments 
shown in Table II, but was leaked during the second set of 
experiments. Overall, these results evidence that, although the 
APPs in iOS leak less information than in Android OS, several 
pieces of personal information may still be leaked in iOS APPs. 
 
Fig. 5. Android OS and iOS comparison; Percentage of evaluated APPs that 
leak unique identifiers and personal information during the usage process. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have evaluated the amount of personal 
information and unique identifiers that benign smartphone APPs 
leak to third parties during the installation and use of the APPs, 
when accessing the Internet. We have implemented a MitM 
proxy setup to intercept the network traffic generated by the 
APPs. An active WiFi monitoring platform has been designed 
for the interception, decryption and analysis of a user’s personal 
information derived from popular APPs installed on different 
smartphones of two distinctive vendors. 
The experimental methodology implemented to conduct the 
experiments has involved the configuration and evaluation of 
multiple software tools. During the assessment of the two rogue 
AP tools used to provide access to the Internet through the MitM 
monitoring machine, it was concluded that HostAPd was the 
performing better in our experiments. We found that HostAPd, 
in contrast to Airbase-ng, flags the MAC layer frame 
retransmissions appropriately. This is an advantage because 
HostAPd achieves a performance that closely resembles the 
expected behaviour from a legitimate AP. Similarly, we have 
evaluated two different MitM proxies, Mallory and mitmproxy. 
Mallory was initially chosen for our experiments, but it was 
discarded at a later stage as it was unable to unencrypt correctly 
the SSL/TLS intercepted network traffic. Hence, Mimtproxy 
was consequently adopted as an alternative to Mallory. 
The results presented in this work have shown that numerous 
unique identifiers and private information are leaked by multiple 
of the evaluated APPs. One significant finding is that most of 
the information is leaked solely during the installation process. 
Hence, it is recommended that APPs are installed only on 
trustworthy networks to reduce the risk of personal information 
being compromised. Additionally, iOS APPs were identified to 
leak much less information than in the Android OS. 
The technical advancement that we have conducted on 
setting up the active monitoring platform has allowed us to be 
able to implement MitM attacks in a WiFi network. As for future 
work, we wish to use this platform to enhance our understanding 
of MitM attacks and thereby assess the possibility of extending 
and complementing this type of attack with injection 
capabilities, and to develop a detection mechanism that would 
accurately identify the presence of these attacks. 
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